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 Cultural Distance and Interstate Conflicts1 
Vincenzo Bove and Gunes Gokmen  
 
Abstract 
 
The literature on the impact of culture on the conduct of international 
affairs, in particular on conflict proneness, is growing fast. Yet, the question 
of whether markers of identity influence disputes between states is still 
subject to disputes, and the empirical evidence on Huntington’s clash of 
civilizations thesis is ambiguous. One issue is the dichotomous nature of 
the culture variables used, which reduces the dimensionality of the 
problem significantly. A second issue is considering countries’ individual 
identities as immutable objects, when the religious and ethnic makeup of 
modern societies have dramatically changed in the last few decades. We 
use an array of measures of cultural distance between states, including 
time-varying and continuous variables, and run a battery of alternative 
empirical models. Regardless of how we operationalize cultural distance 
and the empirical specification used, our models consistently show that 
conflict is more likely between culturally distant countries. 
 
 
In 1993, in his controversial “The Clash of Civilizations" thesis, Samuel 
Huntington argues that cultural identity is to become the principal focus of 
individual allegiance and could ultimately lead to an increasing number of 
clashes between states, regardless of political incentives and constraints. In the 
post-Cold War world in particular, Huntington2 argues, the main source of 
conflict would not be ideological, political or economic differences but rather 
cultural. In other words, fundamental differences between the largest blocks of 
cultural groups - the so-called "civilizations" - would increase the likelihood of 
conflict along the cultural fault lines separating those groups. 
According to Huntington3, a civilization is "the highest cultural grouping of 
people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have." This definition is 
imprecise and is difficult to operationalize. Huntington4 argues that the world 
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 could be divided into discrete macro-cultural areas, the Western, Latin 
American, Confucian (Sinic), Islamic, Slavic-Orthodox, Hindu, Japanese, 
Buddhist, and a "possible African" civilizations. As the list makes clear, the 
central defining characteristic of a civilization is religion, and in fact, conflicts 
between civilizations are mostly between peoples of different religions while 
language is a secondary distinguishing factor.5  
In the following years, his thesis has been the subject of a number of 
empirical studies on the effect of cultural differences on conflict.6 Interestingly 
however, while the methods are quite similar, they fail to reach a consensus on 
the very existence of a “clash of civilizations". In fact, only Bolks and Stoll,7 
Tusicisny,8 Ellis,9 and Gokmen10 lend empirical support to Huntington’s thesis. 
Common to all of these studies is the extensive reliance on dichotomous 
variables to mark the cultural identity of each state in the international system. 
In fact, virtually all of the above studies use Huntington’s minimalist 
classification, the only exceptions being Henderson11 and Gartzke and 
Gleditsch12, who look at cultural, linguistic and religious similarity within dyads 
(i.e., whether A and B have the same dominant linguistic, ethnic or religious 
group). Nevertheless, they reach similar conclusions: religious similarity within 
dyads decreases the risk of war onset, while both ethnic and linguistic similarity 
have the opposite effect.13 
Despite the efforts to move beyond Huntington’s oversimplification, they still 
suffer from the limitations inherent in the “dichotomization" of a continuous 
concept. There are two unfortunate consequences of this. First, while states might 
not share the exact same culture in most of the cases, they often still have some 
degree of commonality of culture. To put it differently, the likelihood that two 
countries share a common identity is a function of their cultural distance. This 
means that cultural and linguistic differences fit more easily along a continuum 
rather than within distinct boxes. As culture forms identities, it is the share of 
common identity which makes it more likely that states have common norms, 
similar perceptions, ideas and preferences. If anything then, cultural bonds or, 
conversely, cultural distances between two countries are likely to affect their 
conflicting interactions. Similarly, the degree of cultural similarities makes 
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 coordination, and, as a result, the resolution of a conflict less problematic.14 The 
amount of similarities then, or the cultural distance between countries, should 
imply better coordination and communication channels between them, and in 
turn, should lower the chances of observing militarized conflict between them. We 
conjecture that the reason why the previous literature failed to reach a consensus 
is the dichotomous nature of the culture variables used. This choice reduces the 
dimensionality of the problem significantly. Therefore, this may not allow one to 
capture enough variation, which makes identification all the more difficult. 
Second, the above studies consider countries’ individual identities as immutable 
objects. This shortcoming is all the more remarkable as it ignores the fact that the 
very religious, racial and ethnic makeup of modern societies have dramatically 
changed in the last few decades as a consequence of mass migration.  According 
to the World Bank, the global migrant stock almost doubled between 1960 and 
2000, rising from 92 million to 165 million.15 As a consequence of this, the 
populations in modern societies have become substantially more heterogeneous 
along traditional dimensions such as national origin or ethnicity. New immigrants 
from Asia and Latin America have added a large degree of cultural diversity to the 
U.S. population in recent decades, just as waves of immigrants from Eastern Europe 
are changing the composition of Western European societies and South-South 
migrations are profoundly changing the structure of the receiving countries. By 
ignoring the time-varying dimension of culture, the above studies have failed to 
duly account for the changing nature of modern societies. Yet, to date there has 
been no attempt to improve our understanding of what defines cultural distances in 
the first place, and which elements of cultural distance matter the most in 
determining inter-state wars. 
This research note offers an extensive empirical analysis of the relationship 
between identity and interstate disputes by including a number of ad-hoc 
measures of cultural distance in the benchmark empirical models on the 
likelihood of militarized interstate disputes. By moving beyond simple 
indicators of common religion or similar language, our findings suggest that 
conflict is more likely between culturally distant countries. For example, the 
average marginal effect of international language barrier on the probability of 
conflict relative to the average probability of conflict is around 65%. Overall, we 
find that the average marginal impact of cultural distance on the likelihood of 
conflict relative to the average probability of conflict is in the range of 10% to 
129%. Our results are robust to the inclusion of a nearly exhaustive set of other 
known determinants of interstate war and to different model specifications. 
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 In the following sections we describe the data on cultural distance (Section 2) 
and the methodological approach (Section 3). We then discuss the results (Section 
4) and provide some conclusive remarks (Section 5). In the Online Appendix we 
further review the literature on the conceptualization of cultural distance, include 
some empirical models with the full set of control variables, and identify a number 
of questions to explore in future research. In particular, we discuss the “cultural 
homogeneity” assumption; we suggest more refined measures of cultural 
distance, using e.g., geo-referenced cultural zones; and we consider in more 
details our additional findings on the issue of conflict escalation   
 
MEASURING CULTURAL DISTANCE 
 
To effectively capture cross-cultural variations between states, we employ five 
different indexes along linguistic and cultural distances. First, to capture the 
linguistic distance between two countries, we use the language barrier index, 
which has been recently used to show that language barriers are significantly 
negatively correlated with bilateral trade.16 The language barrier for a pair of 
languages is calculated using linguistic data provided by the World Atlas of 
Languages, which gives detailed information on 2650 languages. In particular, 
for each language, the atlas provides up to 139 linguistic features, which fall into 
10 linguistic categories. Each feature assumes one of several values. All features 
listed for each language pair are considered, and a score 0 is assigned if a feature 
has the same value for both languages, and the score 1 if the values differ from 
each other. The average of the resulting list of scores is the language barrier, which 
ranges between 0 and 1. 0 means no language barrier, i.e. the two languages are 
basically identical, and 1 means two languages have no features in common (e.g., 
Tonga-Bangladesh). Since more than one language is spoken in some countries, 
we employ two alternative indexes: the basic language barrier, which uses the 
main official languages, as well as the international language barrier, which uses 
the most widely spoken world languages. 
Second, we adopt Kogut and Singh’s17 standardized measure of cultural 
differences as well as an improved version provided by Kandogan.18 Although 
the degree of cultural differences is notably difficult to conceptualize, Kogut 
and Singh19 offer a simple and standardized measure of cultural dis- tance, 
which is based on Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions of national culture. In 
particular, Kogut & Singh (1988) develop a mathematical measure of “cultural 
distance” (CD) as a composite index based on the deviation from each of 
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 Hofstede’s20 four national culture scales: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
masculinity/femininity, and individualism.21  
These dimensions of culture are rooted in people’s values, where values are 
"broad preferences for one state of affairs over others [...]; they are opinions on 
how things are and they also affect our behavior".22 As such, by explicitly taking 
into account the values held by the majority of the population in each of the 
surveyed countries, these dimensions can effectively capture differences in 
countries’ norms, perceptions, and ways to deal with conflicting situations. 
Higher cultural distance pertains to higher divergence in opinions, norms, or 
values. This should, in turn, affect the odds of conflict between countries. 
The method by Kogut and Singh23 is widely adopted by a large number of 
scholars, in particular in international business and economics, where it has been 
applied to foreign investment expansion, entry mode choice, and the performance 
of foreign invested affiliates, among others. Yet, Kandogan24 demonstrates that 
this method is based on the assumption of zero covariance between different 
dimensions of culture. Since this assumption might fail for several cultural 
dimensions of countries measured by Hofstede25 we also use Kandogan’s26 
modification to this measure that corrects for this potentially weak assumption, 
and hence produces more accurate measures of cultural distance. 
Third, to cross-validate our empirical findings on cultural distance and to duly 
take into account societal dynamics and changes in the composition of societies, 
we use another popular quantitative measure of cultural distance, which is based 
on The World Values Surveys (WVS). Conducted between 1998 and 2006, the 
surveys provide standardized data for a broad and varying set of issues related 
to economics, politics, religion, gender roles, family values, communal 
identities, civic engagement, ethical concerns, environmental protection, and 
scientific and technological progress.27 We use the composite value of two 
dimensions, traditional vs. secular-rational values and survival vs. self-expression 
values, which account for more than 70% of the cross- cultural variance. The 
traditional vs. secular-rational values dimension captures the difference 
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 between societies in which religion is very important and those in which it is 
not. In particular, societies closer to the traditional pole are more likely to display 
deference to authority and show high degrees of national pride and a 
nationalistic outlook while societies with secular-rational values have opposite 
preferences. The second dimension is linked to the transition from industrial 
society to post-industrial societies. Societies near the self-expression pole tend 
to prioritize well-being and the quality of life issues, such as women’s 
emancipation and equal status for racial and sexual minorities, over economic and 
physical security. Broadly speaking, members of the societies in which 
individuals focus more on survival find foreigners and outsiders, ethnic 
diversity, and cultural change to be threatening. The distance between two 
countries is simply the absolute value of the difference between their scores 
while the aggregate distance is the square root of the sum of squared differences. 
Since the surveys were not conducted on an annual basis, our yearly measure 
of cultural distance is obtained by linear interpolation. 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our variables of interest, cultural 
distance variables.28 All of our variables of interest have sizable variation to 
allow us to capture the effect of cultural distance on conflict. The means and the 
standard deviations of Language Barrier and International Language Barrier 
variables have comparable values. Similarly, the means and the standard 
deviations of the two Cultural Distance variables a la Kogut and Kandogan are 
very close. 
Additionally, Table 2 presents pairwise correlations across our cultural 
variables of interest. We observe that all of the cultural distance variables are 
positively and significantly correlated. Language Barrier is highly correlated 
with International Language Barrier, 61%, and Cultural Distance a la Kogut is 
very highly correlated with Cultural Distance a la Kandogan, 94%. 
Interestingly, Cultural Distance (WVS) based on the World Values Survey also 
shows positive correlation with the remaining cultural distance measures. Thus, 
these correlations tell us that all the cultural distance measures not only capture 
some common underlying element of culture, but they also account for some 
distinct characteristic of culture that is not captured with the remaining 
measures. 
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
We estimate the impact of cultural differences on military conflict by building 
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 on two recent and nearly exhaustive analyses of the determinants of Militarized 
Interstate Disputes (MIDs),29 Martin et al.30 and Gartzke and Gleditsch.31  
 
We start by estimating a model similar to the benchmark specifications of 
Martin et al. 32 which use a large data set of military conflicts on the 1950- 2000 
period. We choose this model over other alternatives as it possibly has the most 
exhaustive list of controls that can potentially affect the probability of MIDs. The 
model is a logistic regression with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering 
by dyads. The purpose of the original model is to show that countries more 
open to global trade have a higher probability of war because multilateral trade 
openness reduces the cost of a bilateral conflict by decreasing bilateral 
dependence; accordingly, Martin et al. include both measures of bilateral 
openness (i.e. the average of bilateral import flows over GDP) and multilateral 
trade openness (i.e. the average of total imports of the two countries excluding 
their bilateral imports divided by their GDPs). Other control variables are year 
dummies, whose coefficients are not reported, and a set of 20 different dummies 
(coefficients also unreported) coded as 1 when the country pair was involved in 
an MID in t - 1, t - 2, ...t - 20 to control for the temporal autocorrelation in wars. The 
model also includes variables which are common in the trade literature such as a 
dummy of zero trade; an index of similarity of language; the existence of a 
preferential trade area; the number of GATT/WTO members in the country pair; 
and dummies of colonial relationship and a dummy for country pairs with a 
common colonizer.33 Political controls include the sum of areas of the two 
countries (in log); the sum of democracy indexes; and measures of political 
affinity such as the UN vote correlation (lagged by 4 years) and a dummy for the 
presence of a military alliance within a country pair. Finally, to deal with the issue 
of cross- sectional serial correlation of wars, Martin et al. include the number of 
MIDs in which the countries of the pair are involved in time t (excluding their 
potential bilateral MID), and the distance to the nearest current war which does not 
involve a country from the pair.  
To assess the sensitivity of our results, we also build on Garzke and Gledtisch’s34 
model specifications. The likelihood of a militarized dispute in a dyad is estimated 
by a logit model with robust standard errors clustered at the pair level and cubic 
splines that take into account temporal dependencies and heteroskedasticity. The 
analysis includes all dyad years between 1950 and 2001. Gartzke and Gleditsch’s 
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 model controls for the (log of) distance between capital cities; a dummy variable 
scored 1 if there is direct geographic contiguity; the lowest value of the polity 
score and the lowest value of the GDP per capita (in log) for the two countries in 
a dyad; the logged ratio of the larger to smaller GDP (called capability ratio); a 
dichotomous variable scored 1 if at least one state in a dyad is classified as a major 
power;35 a dummy scored 1 if a dyad entails the presence of a defense pact, 
neutrality pact, or entente, based on the Correlates of War (COW) Alliance data36 
and the number of peaceful years (since the last MID) between the two countries. 
Table A.1 in the Online Appendix presents some summary statistics on the 
number of observations and the frequency of war for the full sample 1950-2001, as 
well as the same summary statistics for the independent variables of the two 
alternative models. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Results are reported in Tables 3-7. To facilitate the reading, we only show our 
variables of interest and anticipate that the results are largely consistent with 
expectations and previous studies when we turn to our control variables. We refer 
the interest readers to the Online Appendix, Tables A.2 and A.3, for the full set of 
control variables and to the corresponding models in Martin et al. 37  and Gartzke 
and Gleditsch38 for a full discussion of them. 
As we said above, we start our analysis in Table 3 with specifications following 
Martin et al. We asses the impact of our cultural distance measures on conflict. All 
five measures of cultural distance have a positive effect on conflict involvement. 
In other words, culturally more distant states fight more on average. In column (i) of 
Table 3, we see that Language Barrier positively affects conflict, although 
insignificant. When we take into account International Language Barrier in column 
(ii), however, it has a positive and significant effect on conflict involvement. This 
should not come as a surprise as the part of the culture of a country that is reflected 
in a language should be more related to the spoken languages rather than the 
official ones. To assess the magnitude of the effects, for each model we calculate 
the standardized marginal effect as the average marginal effect of a cultural 
distance variable on the probability of conflict relative to the average probability of 
conflict, which is about 0.0066. This effect is sizeable for International Language 
Barrier and is around 65%. When we use the Cultural Distance (Kogut) measure, 
instead, the results are qualitatively similar. Cultural distance increases the 
probability of conflict and this effect is significant at the one percent level. The 
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 standardized marginal effect, however, is reduced this time around, and is about 
14%. The standardized marginal effect of Cultural Distance (Kandogan) on 
conflict probability is similar at 11%, with a significance level of 10%. The effect 
of Cultural Distance (WVS) is also positive and significant. However, the large 
standardized marginal effect should be interpreted with caution as the number of 
countries that are in the WVS is limited due to data availability.  All the results 
from our cultural distance measures considered together, evidence suggests that 
cultural distance increases the likelihood of interstate militarized conflict.39 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Additionally, in Figure 1, we present the odds ratios of the coefficients of Table 
3 together with their 95% confidence intervals. For example, holding all other 
variables constant, we would see a 25% and 19% increase in the odds of conflict 
for a one-unit increase in Cultural Distance (Kogut) and Cultural Distance 
(Kandogan) variables, respectively; while the same increase in Language Barrier 
raises the odds of conflict by 52%. 
Next, in Table 4, we consider politically relevant dyads. A dyad is politically 
relevant when either the two countries are contiguous or one of them is a major 
power. This sample restriction is often used by conflict researchers as such dyads are 
supposed to be more at risk of international conflict.40 The results are qualitatively 
similar, although the effects of International Language Barrier and Cultural Distance 
(WVS) are larger for politically relevant dyads. For example, on average, one-unit 
increase in the Cultural Distance (Kogut) variable increases the probability of 
conflict by almost 12% with respect to the average probability of conflict, whereas 
this effect is about 77% for International Language Barrier. We also observe some 
reduction in the significance levels; however, this should be expected as we are 
working with a much smaller sample size now. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
In Tables 5 and 6, we evaluate the robustness of our main results to alternative 
estimation methods. We reproduce our main results using a probit model and a linear 
probability model respectively, and, by and large, the results carry over, with the 
sole exception that International Language Barrier has no effect in a linear 
probability model.41 Interestingly, the marginal effects in Table 5 are close to those 
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 of Table 3. For instance, the standardized marginal effects of Cultural Distance 
(Kogut) and Cultural Distance (Kandogan) variables are 12% and 9%, respectively. 
The sizes of the coefficients in Table 6 allow for a direct reading, and can be 
interpreted as slopes or elasticities. Although they indicate a very small marginal 
impact of cultural distance on the probability that two countries are at war, 
remember that the absolute probabilities themselves are small as militarized disputes 
between states are rare overall. In fact, the standardized marginal effects relative to 
the average probability provide a more appropriate interpretation. For example, 
these effects are about 19% and 12% for Cultural Distance (Kogut) and Cultural 
Distance (Kandogan) variables, respectively. We can conclude from these two tables 
that the previous expectations about cultural distance and conflict are strongly borne 
out by this new set of empirical results. Our results are not sensitive to the method 
of estimation, and cultural distance increases the likelihood of conflict. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 about here 
 
 
 
To assess the robustness of our results to model specification, we build on Garzke 
and Gledtisch’s model. Two key points distinguish our efforts from theirs: the 
inclusion of new, continuous and time-varying proxies for cultural distance, and the 
alternative splines.  Table 7 presents the results.  Our previous findings are 
confirmed one more time. The results are qualitatively similar, and cultural distance 
positively impacts the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes.  In addition, it is 
worth to point out that the significance levels are improved now and the marginal 
effects are larger compared to the previous models of Table 3. From above tables, 
exploring various estimation techniques and specifications, we feel confident to 
conclude that cultural distance has an impact on militarized interstate disputes, and it 
significantly and substantively increases the probability of conflict. Lastly, one might 
argue that there is reverse causality in our models. We do not deem the potential 
problem of endogeneity as a major concern. The consensus in the literature suggests 
that variables such as language, religion, culture are pre-determined to subsequent 
conflict42. Given the period under study covers conflict in the second half of 20th 
century, such persistent and slow-moving cultural variables should not suffer from 
endogeneity to a great extent. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Samuel Huntington’s thesis on the “Clash of Civilizations" is one of the most 
                                                                                                                                          
rare events logit model, and the previous findings carry over. 
 
 fascinating and debated issues in the field of international relations, and has sparked 
a long-lasting debate about its validity among academics, practitioners and policy-
makers. The scholarly literature on international studies have long grappled with 
how to define, characterize, and analyze his thesis. Although some of the seminal 
works provided little support to Huntington’s thesis, later studies seemed to 
partially confirm it. While most of these studies use Huntington’s measure of the 
concept of civilizations, his classification was tentative, imprecise and difficult to 
operationalize. Moreover, previous studies rely on a “dichotomization" of 
civilizations, which is a continuous concept, and treat it as an immutable object,while 
it is certainly subject to variation over time. 
Political events in recent years, such as the NATO-Russia confrontation over 
Ukraine, Russia’s attempts to resurrect its cultural and political dominance in the 
former Soviet sphere, the unprecedented rise of Islamic extremism in the Middle 
East, the foundation of an organization like ISIS with a declared aim to build a 
Muslim caliphate and wage war on Western civilization, or the rise of 
independence and anti-EU movements in Europe, have been attributed by many 
political observers to cultural clashes. We argue that whether and how identity 
impacts the likelihood of militarized interstate dispute hinges crucially on the 
definition and operationalization of “civilizations" or cultural similarity. 
We therefore introduce a number of ad-hoc measures of cultural distance in the 
benchmark empirical models on the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes. 
Regardless of how we deal with the definition of cultural distance, the empirical 
evidence points consistently towards the importance of cultural distance in ex- 
plaining the odds of inter-state conflict. Although the extent of evidence for an effect 
of cultural distance on conflict clearly depends on model specification and data 
considerations, in particular the size of the effect, our results suggest that conflict is 
more likely between culturally distant countries. 
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Figure 1: Odds Ratios of Table 3 Coefficients 
 
Note: Cultural Distance (WVS) is scaled down by 100 for the sake of readability. 
  
 
  Table 1: Summary Statistics of Cultural Distance Variables   
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
Language Barrier 0.428 0.201 0 1 197422 
International Language Barrier 0.366 0.200 0 1 203166 
Cultural Distance (Kogut) 9.639 0.949 5.398 11.554 83409 
Cultural Distance (Kandogan) 9.695 0.856 5.262 11.503 83409 
Cultural Distance (WVS) 0.999 0.342 0.048 1.737 4568 
  
 
  Table 2: Correlations Across Variables of Interest   
 Language Barrier (ILB) (Kogut) (Kandogan) 
International Language Barrier (ILB) 
Cultural Distance (Kogut) 
0.610* 
0.044* 
 
0.033* 
  
Cultural Distance (Kandogan) 
Cultural Distance (WVS) 
0.061* 
0.215* 
0.051* 
0.205* 
0.940* 
0.400* 
 
0.325* 
* means significant at the one percent level.     
  
 
   Table 3: Cultural Distance and International Conflict   
Dependent Variable: MID i  ii iii iv 
Language Barrier 0.420 
(0.286) 
International Language Barrier 1.069∗∗∗ 
(0.309) 
Cultural Distance (Kogut) 0.230∗∗∗ 
(0.088) 
Cultural Distance (Kandogan)  0.178∗ 
(0.097) 
Cultural Distance (WVS) 2.801∗ 
(1.543) 
Standardized Marginal Effect 25.37 64.96 13.63 10.56 129.36 
N 197422 203166 83409 83409 4568 
 
 
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by dyad. 
Controls: LogDistance, Contiguity, Sum Areas, Colonial Link, Number of Peaceful Years, 
Alliance, UN Vote Correlation, Sum of Democracy Indexes, Number of Other Wars, Log 
Distance to Nearest War, Log Bilateral Opennes, Log Multilateral Openness, Zero Trade 
Dummy, Common Official Language, Free Trade Areas, Number of GATT members in the 
Dyad, time fixed-effects and past conflict dummies (last 20 years.) 
 Table 4: Cultural Distance and International Conflict, Politically Relevant 
Dyads 
Dependent Variable: MID i  ii iii iv v 
Language Barrier 0.354 
(0.318) 
International Language Barrier 1.242∗∗∗ 
(0.326) 
Cultural Distance (Kogut) 0.197∗∗ 
(0.095) 
Cultural Distance (Kandogan) 0.131 
(0.106) 
Cultural Distance (WVS) 7.829∗∗ 
(3.801) 
Standardized Marginal Effect 21.86 76.92 11.71 7.84 234.87 
N 25111 25562 13544 13544 930 
 
 
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by dyad. 
Controls: LogDistance, Contiguity, Sum Areas, Colonial Link, Number of Peaceful Years, 
Alliance, UN Vote Correlation, Sum of Democracy Indexes, Number of Other Wars, Log 
Distance to Nearest War, Log Bilateral Opennes, Log Multilateral Openness, Zero Trade 
Dummy, Common Official Language, Free Trade Areas, Number of GATT members in the 
Dyad, time fixed-effects and past conflict dummies (last 20 years.) 
 Table 5: Alternative Methods: Probit 
Dependent Variable: MID i  ii iii iv v 
Language Barrier 0.127 
(0.116) 
International Language Barrier 0.412∗∗∗ 
(0.131) 
Cultural Distance (Kogut) 0.093∗∗ 
(0.037) 
Cultural Distance (Kandogan)  0.071∗ 
(0.042) 
Cultural Distance (WVS) 0.978∗ 
(0.525) 
Standardized Marginal Effect 17.28 56.37 12.26 9.36 99.21 
N 197422 203166 83409 83409 4568 
 
 
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by dyad. 
Controls: LogDistance, Contiguity, Sum Areas, Colonial Link, Number of Peaceful Years, 
Alliance, UN Vote Correlation, Sum of Democracy Indexes, Number of Other Wars, Log Distance 
to Nearest War, Log Bilateral Opennes, Log Multilateral Openness, Zero Trade Dummy, Common 
Official Language, Free Trade Areas, Number of GATT members in the Dyad, time fixed-effects 
and past conflict dummies (last 20 years.) 
 Table 6: Alternative Methods: Linear Probability Model 
Dependent Variable: MID  i ii iii iv v 
Language Barrier -0.001 
(0.001) 
International Language Barrier 0.0004 
(0.002) 
Cultural Distance (Kogut) 0.001∗∗∗ 
(0.000) 
Cultural Distance (Kandogan)  0.001∗ 
(0.000) 
Cultural Distance (WVS) 0.008∗∗∗ 
(0.002) 
Standardized Marginal Effect -21.60 8.16 19.10 12.43 159.17 
N 197422 203166 83409 83409 5313 
 
 
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by dyad. 
Controls: LogDistance, Contiguity, Sum Areas, Colonial Link, Number of Peaceful Years, 
Alliance, UN Vote Correlation, Sum of Democracy Indexes, Number of Other Wars, Log 
Distance to Nearest War, Log Bilateral Opennes, Log Multilateral Openness, Zero Trade 
Dummy, Common Official Language, Free Trade Areas, Number of GATT members in the 
Dyad, time fixed-effects and past conflict dummies (last 20 years.) 
 
 
 
 Table 7: Gartzke-Gleditsch Specification 
 
Dependent Variable: MID i ii iii iv v 
Language Barrier 0.740∗∗ 
(0.356) 
International Language Barrier 1.313∗∗∗ 
(0.370) 
Cultural Distance (Kogut) 0.262∗∗ 
(0.118) 
Cultural Distance (Kandogan)  0.227∗ 
(0.128) 
Cultural Distance (WVS) 1.510∗∗ 
(0.590) 
Standardized Marginal Effect 66.14 116.99 22.95 19.91 105.01 
N 360784 372402 122392 122392 6801 
 
 
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by dyad. 
Controls: LogDistance, Contiguity, Lower of Democracy score, Lower of GDP per capita, 
Trade to GDP ratio, Capability ratio, Major Power, Alliance, Peace Years, Cubic Splines. 
